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Abstract. Adaptive networks are a versatile approach to model phe-
nomena such as contagion and spreading dynamics, critical transitions
and structure formation that emerge from the dynamic coevolution of
complex network structure and node states. Adaptive networks have
been successfully applied to study and understand phenomena ranging
from epidemic spreading, infrastructure, swarm dynamics and opin-
ion formation to the sustainable use of renewable resources. Here, we
study critical transitions in contagion dynamics on multilayer adaptive
networks with dynamic node states and present an application to the
governance of sustainable resource use. We focus on a three layer adap-
tive network model, where a polycentric governance network interacts
with a social network of resource users which in turn interacts with
an ecological network of renewable resources. We uncover that sus-
tainability is favored for slow interaction timescales, large homophilic
network adaptation rate (as long it is below the fragmentation thresh-
old) and high taxation rates. Interestingly, we also observe a trade-off
between an eco-dictatorship (reduced model with a single governance
actor that always taxes unsustainable resource use) and the polycentric
governance network of multiple actors. In the latter setup, sustainabil-
ity is enhanced for low but hindered for high tax rates compared to the
eco-dictatorship case. These results highlight mechanisms generating
emergent critical transitions in contagion dynamics on multilayer adap-
tive network and show how these can be understood and approximated
analytically, relevant for understanding complex adaptive systems from
various disciplines ranging from physics and epidemiology to sociology
and global sustainability science. The paper also provides insights into
potential critical intervention points for policy in the form of taxes in
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the governance of sustainable renewable resource use that can inform
more process-detailed social-ecological modeling.
1 Introduction
Adaptive networks are a flexible approach to model phenomena such as contagion
and spreading phenomena, critical transitions and structure formation that emerge
from the dynamic coevolution of complex network structure and node states [28,36,
38]. Adaptive networks have been successfully applied to study and understand phe-
nomena ranging from epidemic spreading [37] and early warning signals for critical
transitions therein [22], swarm dynamics [12,8], evolution of autocatalytic sets [31,
32], opinion formation [28] and spreading of behaviors such as smoking [5] to the
sustainable use of renewable resources and modelling social-ecological transforma-
tions [24,40,34,10]. Recently, adaptive dynamics have also been studied in multilayer
network models that allow for representing different types of nodes or agents and
their complex interconnections in a structured way [33,29,4].
Adaptive networks are also recognized as a promising approach to build a bridge
between theoretical physics and efforts to understand future trajectories of the Earth
system in the Anthropocene where human social dynamics has become a dominant
geological process [27,20]. By modelling complex social systems as adaptive multilayer
networks embedded in land-use [1] or more comprehensive Earth system models [11,
19], methods from complex systems theory, nonlinear dynamics and statistical physics
can be applied to identify management options, critical transitions, tipping points
and critical intervention points towards sustainable development [23], map out safe
operating spaces for these systems [16,14,18], and more generally, analyze complex
co-evolutionary dynamics of human-environment systems including the evolution of
technological and knowledge systems [21,6]. Important recent challenges in this field
include the identification of sensitive intervention points for policy [13] and adaptive
multi-level governance strategies [15] that can help to overcome systemic blockages
and initiate the deep social-ecological transformations [34] needed to avoid dangerous
anthropogenic climate change and degradation of biosphere integrity [41].
While the control of adaptive network dynamics has already been studied in the
context of opinion formation influenced via zealotry [26], a stylized form of lobbyism,
there is an increasing interest in studying modern polycentric, adaptive and multi-
level governance and management of social-ecological systems from a complex systems
perspective [15], creating bridges to the theory of governance networks from political
science [7]. In this paper, we derive and analyze an adaptive multilayer network
model to investigate the dynamics of an adaptive and polycentric governance network
interacting with an adaptive social network of users of private renewable resources,
extending upon the recently proposed and studied copan:EXPLOIT model [24,40].
In the extended model, termed copan:TAXPLOIT in this paper, governance nodes
can either penalize associated unsustainable resource users by introducing taxes or
can be indifferent to the level of resource exploitation (i.e., by not introducing any
tax). The trait of enforcing such an environmental tax can spread contagiously on
the governance network via social learning. Additionally, the governance network can
adapt via homophilic rewiring. Analogously, in the resource user layer the trait of
sustainable or unsustainable resource exploitation can spread via social learning and
the users’ social network can adapt via homophilic rewiring as well (Fig. 1).
We study this multilayer adaptive network system using numerical simulations
and analytical approximations. We particularly focus on analyzing the conditions
a e-mail: barfuss@pik-potsdam.de
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Fig. 1. Schematic visualization of the interdependent three-layer model consisting of a
resource layer Gr, a user layer Gu and a governance layer Gg.
under which adaptive polycentric governance fosters the sustainable use of renewable
resources and increases the resilience and size of the sustainable safe operating space
of the system. We also identify critical transitions and tipping points, e.g. in the tax
rate parameter, that separate domains of sustainable and unsustainable outcomes in
parameter space.
We introduce the studied multilayer adaptive network model in detail in Sect. 2,
report and discuss results of numerical simulations and analytical approximations
(Sect. 3), and finish with concluding remarks (Sect. 4).
2 Model description
In the following we describe the multilayer adaptive network model of three layers that
is studied in this work. It consists of an ecological resource layer representing a set
of logistically growing resources, a user layer representing a set of agents harvesting
these resources, and a governance layer representing agents superordinate to agents
in the user layer. Nodes in the governance layer can enforce taxes on certain types of
user behavior. The general setup of the model is summarized and visualized in Fig. 1.
2.1 Resource layer
The first layer Gr(V r) consists of a set V r of Nr mutually disconnected nodes si, i =
1, . . . , Nr each representing dynamics following logistic growth,
dsi
dt
= asi
(
1− si
K
)
, (1)
where a denotes the growth rate and K denotes the maximum capacity. We use
identical a and K for all resource nodes for simplicity in this study, but heterogeneities
in these properties can yield interesting effects as well [40]. Note that from here on, we
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use si to denote the current state of the resource but to also refer to the corresponding
node in Gr. Without loss of generality we can set a = K = 1 and, hence, express
the time t in terms of the inverse growth rate 1/a, and the resource stock si in terms
of the maximum capacity K. If undisturbed, si displays two fixed points si,0 = 0
(unstable) and si,0 = 1 (stable).
2.2 User layer
The second layer in our interdependent model Gu(V u, Luij) represents a set V
u of
Nu = Nr agents i = 1, . . . , Nu that harvest exactly one of the resources si with some
effort (or strategy) Ei along a link (i, si) ∈ Luri , where Luri denotes the set of directed
links pointing from Gu to Gr. Depending on the currently employed effort level, a
node i ∈ V u gains an instantaneous harvest hi = qEisi from the resource. Here, q
denotes the so-called catch coefficient or efficiency [30]. As we are only interested in
an inter comparison of efforts across agents, we measure the effort in units of that
efficiency by setting q = 1 [24]. Harvesting effectively reduces the amount of available
stock si to each node i and hence, Eq. (1) is adjusted to ultimately read
dsi
dt
= si (1− si)− Eisi. (2)
Each agent/node chooses between two values of effort level E− = 1−∆E and E+ =
1 +∆E that cause the resource to either converge into a stable fixed point si,0 = ∆E
for E− and si,0 = 0 for E+. We therefore denote E− the sustainable and E+ the
unsustainable effort. In order to further reduce the number of free parameters we
set ∆E = 0.5 according to earlier studies [24,40] ensuring that at the fixed point
s∗ = ∆E the equilibrium harvest h0 = ∆E(1−∆E) is maximized.
Pairs of nodes i ∈ V u interact and update their strategies similarly to the adap-
tive voter model [28,36,38,29,4] with the process of pure imitation replaced by social
learning [3,2,24,40]. Therefore, edges Luij in the user layer G
u indicate a connection
(such as friendship or business relationships) between the nodes i along which opinion
formation takes place via the exchange of information on current harvesting strategies
Ei and corresponding harvest hi. To combine discrete opinion formation with contin-
uous resource dynamics, each node is assigned a unique waiting time Tu,i according
to a Poissonian distribution that is drawn randomly after each interaction of that
corresponding node i,
P (Tu,i) =
1
∆Tu
exp
(
− Tu,i
∆Tu
)
. (3)
Here, ∆Tu is understood as the average waiting time of nodes in the user layer. It di-
rectly relates to the rate of interaction between the agents as compared to the typical
timescale of the resource dynamics. In that sense, a short waiting waiting time corre-
sponds to more impatient agents while a high waiting time indicates comparatively
patient agents.
In each time step, the node i with the smallest waiting time Tu,i becomes active
and all stocks si are integrated forward by Tu,i. Then, a random neighbor j of i is
chosen such that (i, j) ∈ Luij . If the effort levels, i.e., strategies, Ei and Ej differ, there
is a probability φ for i to break its connection with j and homophilically establish
a new link to a formerly unconnected node n such that Ei = En. In addition, with
probability 1− φ, i mimics the harvest strategy of j with a probability P (Ei → Ej)
depending on the difference in immediate harvest hi and hj ,
P (Ei → Ej) = 1
2
(tanh (hj − hi) + 1) . (4)
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The hyperbolic function represents the monotonic increase of the likelihood for
social learning with an increase in the expected harvest differences [3,2]. After fin-
ishing one step, a new waiting time for i is drawn according to Eq. (3) and added to
the current Tu,i. This iteration scheme continues until the model reaches a consensus
state where either all nodes in Gu follow the same strategy Ei = Ej ∀ i, j = 1, . . . Nu
or Gu has fragmented into disconnected components consisting solely of nodes with
the same strategy. Overall, the user and resource layers follow the same dynamics
as encoded in the EXPLOIT model [24,40], given that the governance layer is in an
indifferent state and, hence, exerts no influence on resource users (see below).
2.3 Governance layer
Social systems often obey a hierarchical structure [35] including, e.g., super- and
subordinate agents. To incorporate such effects, our model additionally consists of a
third layer Gg(V g, Lgkl) which, for the sake of illustration, is denoted the governance
layer. This layer consists of Ng nodes k that are connected via a set of links L
g
kl
indicating an abstract form of, e.g, diplomatic relationships. Nodes k can be in one
of either two states Sk: S− (taxing) or S+ (indifferent), which are to some extent
analogous to the sustainable and unsustainable states of nodes in the user layer Gu.
Additionally each node i ∈ V u in the user layer is connected to exactly one node
k ∈ V g in the governance layer (implying that Ng ≤ Nu).
Nodes k ∈ V g also follow an opinion formation process along the lines of the
extended adaptive voter model as described above. Hence, for each node k ∈ V g
we draw waiting times Tg,i according to Eq. 3 and set an average waiting time ∆Tg
unique to the governance layer Gg. As above, once node k becomes active, a neighbor
l that is connected with k is drawn uniformly at random. With probability φ and if
the states of the two nodes differ (i.e., Sl 6= Sk), k breaks its connection with l and
establishes a new link to a previously unconnected node n ∈ V g, such that Sk = Sn.
For the sake of reducing the number of free parameters, we employ the same rewiring
probability φ in Gu and Gg. In contrast to nodes i ∈ V u, a node k ∈ V g does not
harvest from its own resource stock, but instead measures the cumulative harvests hi
of all nodes i that k is connected to via interdependence links Lugik , such that
hk =
∑
i∈V u|(i,k)∈Lugik
hi, k ∈ V g (5)
Hence, the probability for a node k ∈ Gg to update its state Sk to the state Sl of one
of its neighboring nodes l then reads,
P (Sk → Sl) = 1
2
(tanh (hl − hk) + 1) . (6)
As in Eq. (4) the hyperbolic tangent represents the experimentally observed increased
likelihood for social learning as a function of the difference in cumulative harvest [3,
2]. If k is now in the taxing state, it favors the long-term sustainable strategy E−
and, hence, taxes those connected subordinate nodes i ∈ V u that are employing the
non-sustainable strategy E+ at a rate γ ∈ [0, 1]. γ effectively lowers the harvests of
nodes i with Ei = E+ such that the probability for learning another node’s effort
level as given in Eq. (4) is modified to read
P (Ei → Ej) = 1
2
tanh (αjhj − αihi) + 1
2
(7)
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Where αi = (1 − γ) if Ei = E+ and the superordinate node k ∈ V g of i is in the
taxing state (the same holds for node j). Otherwise, we set αi = 1 (αj = 1). Thus,
governance nodes k in the taxing state punish unsustainable strategies of nodes i in
the user layer.
In order to ensure that the social learning process in both layers reaches consensus
at approximately the same time Tc we demand that
Tc = Xg∆Tg = Xu∆Tu, (8)
where Xg and Xu is the total number of pairwise interactions between nodes in G
g
and Gu, respectively. Assuming that only learning, no adaptation and no interac-
tion between the layers takes place, X• has previously been analytically derived as
X• = Nµ21/µ2 [39], where µn is the n-th moment of the degree distribution and N
is the number of nodes in the respective network. As we initialize each layer as an
Erdo˝s-Reny´ı random graph [25] with linking probability ρ (see Sec. 2.4) we obtain a
Poissonian degree distribution with µ1 = µ2 = Nρ. This yields
N2g ρ∆Tg = N
2
uρ∆Tu → ∆Tg = (Nu/Ng)2∆Tu. (9)
Hence, we can express the average waiting time ∆Tg for nodes k ∈ V g in the gov-
ernance layer in terms of the average waiting time ∆Tu for nodes i ∈ V u in the
user layer Gu. This assumption also holds if one considers an adaptive network were
only rewiring and no change in node state (φ = 1) takes place. Then the time to
reach a fragmented state depends linearly on the number of edges that connect nodes
of different states. If one considers a random network topology with only two uni-
formly distributed node states this number of cross-links (and thus X•) again depends
quadratically on the number of nodes such that Eq. (9) also holds for this limiting
case. A further in-depth investigation of X• for cases of φ ∈ (0, 1) is beyond the scope
of this work. However, for the purpose of dimension reduction within this study we
assume Eq. (9) to approximately hold for those cases as well.
Also note, that since we demanded Ng ≤ Nu it follows that ∆Tg ≥ ∆Tu, which is
consistent with the association of network layers to users and governance actors such
that governance processes commonly happen on a slower timescale than economic
resource use decisions.
2.4 Initial conditions and model setup
For the following analysis, we initialize our model as three coupled Erdo˝s-Reny´ı ran-
dom graphs with Nu = Nr = 500, Ng = 50, linking probability ρg = ρu = 0.05
for the governance (Gg) and the user layer (Gu), and linking probability ρr = 0 for
the resource layer (Gr). Each node i ∈ V u in the user layer is connected to exactly
one randomly drawn node k ∈ V g in the governance layer. All stocks in the resource
layer are initially set to si(t = 0) = 1, ∀ i = 1, . . . , Nr. For each node in the user
layer, an initial effort of E+ or E− is drawn uniformly at random. The same holds
(if not specified otherwise) for the initial states of nodes in the governance layer. For
each combination of the taxrate γ, rewiring probability φ, and average waiting time
in the user layer ∆Tu, we perform Monte-Carlo simulations with M = 100 ensemble
members until at least the user layer reaches its consensus state.
3 Results and Discussion
3.1 Social learning in the user layer
We start the analysis by considering a governance network Gg with only one node
that is in the taxing state. This means that effectively no learning dynamics take place
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Fig. 2. Average fraction of sustainable users when unsustainable nodes are always taxed at
rate γ and no rewiring takes place (φ = 0) The dashed line gives the macroscopic critical
Time ∆Tu,crit as given in Eq. (12) ∆Tu,crit decreases with increasing γ such that for a
sufficiently large taxation the critical update time approaches zero at γcrit.
in the governance layer and all nodes in the user layer that employ the unsustainable
strategy (effort level E+) are automatically taxed at rate γ. We refer to this setup as
an “eco-dictatorship” in the following. Additionally, we first focus on the case with
no adaptation in either layer and hence, set φ = 0. Thus, we focus on a case with
solely social learning, i.e., an imitation of harvesting strategies, in the user layer. The
corresponding average fraction of sustainable users in the consensus state depending
on the choice of tax rate γ and user waiting time ∆Tu is displayed in Fig. 2. We mainly
find that, for low tax rates γ and low user waiting times ∆Tu the system is most likely
to converge into a consensus state with all nodes employing the unsustainable strategy
(lower left corner of Fig. 2). This is caused by the fact that for low values of ∆Tu
most pairwise interactions take place before the resource stocks of the unsustainable
agents are depleted to a state where they yield less harvest than those stocks of
sustainable agents. In other words, for low ∆Tu the interaction time scale becomes
much shorter than the time scale of resource dynamics. With increasing tax rate γ
the system converges more likely into a sustainable state even at comparatively low
user waiting times ∆Tu as the effective harvest of unsustainable agents is reduced
more drastically. For very large tax rates γ and/or very large user waiting times ∆Tu
the system converges into a sustainable state as the resource stocks of unsustainable
agents are close to their stable fixed point at s∗ = 0 when most pairwise interactions
happen. On the other hand, high tax rates γ further decrease the effective harvest of
unsustainable agents such that an imitation of the unsustainable strategy becomes
less and less likely (Fig. 2). We additionally observe that there exists a critical user
waiting time ∆Tu,crit above which the system always converges into a sustainable
state regardless the choice of tax rate γ. The same holds for γ itself as there seems
to exists a critical value γcrit above which the system also very likely converges into
a sustainable state. In the following we aim to estimate values of ∆Tu,crit and γcrit.
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3.2 Analytical treatment of limiting cases
For the eco-dictatorship setup studied above, we approximate a critical update time
∆Tu,crit at which the sustainable strategy E− becomes profitable in terms of im-
mediate harvest when compared to the unsustainable one (E+). For this we as-
sume that agents do not update their strategy at times t < ∆Tu,crit and hence
Ei(t) = Ei(0) ∀ t < ∆Tu,crit. In this case the temporal evolution of the correspond-
ing stocks is obtained by integrating Eq. (2) which yields:
s± (t) =
∓∆E
(∓∆E − 1)e±∆Et + 1 (10)
Here s+(t) (s−(t)) denotes the stock for those agents that employ the unsustainable
(sustainable) strategy. If no interactions take place the two strategies yield the same
harvest h•(∆Tu,crit) at time t = ∆Tu,crit and, hence,
(1− γ)s+(∆Tu,crit)(1 +∆E) = s−(∆Tu,crit)(1−∆E). (11)
Plugging in Eq. (10) yields
(1− γ)e−∆E∆Tu,crit + e∆E∆Tu,crit = 2− γ − γ∆E
1−∆E2 . (12)
This equation of the general form ae−x+ex = b is solved by using x = ln
(
1
2
(
b±√b2 − 4a)).
Figure 2 shows the critical user waiting time ∆Tu,crit as a function of the tax rate
γ. We find that the approximated functional form of ∆Tu,crit(γ) provides an upper
bound above which the sustainable strategy almost always succeeds. As expected
∆Tu,crit approaches zero with increasing γ as higher tax rates reduce the effective
harvest of unsustainable agents and, hence, makes the sustainable harvest profitable
much earlier in time.
The critical tax rate γcrit, beyond which the sustainable resource use is always
maintained (for γ ≥ γcrit), can be derived by setting ∆Tu,crit = 0 in Eq. (12). This
yields
γcrit(∆E) = 2
∆E
1 +∆E
(13)
and γcrit =
2
3 for ∆E = 0.5. This matches the numerically computed result of γcrit ≈
0.67 (Fig. 2, intersection of dashed grey line with the abscissa ∆Tu = 0).
3.3 Social learning in governance and user layer
After obtaining the results for a simplified governance layer with just one single node
(the eco-dictatorship), we now turn to the analysis of the full model by settingNg = 50
and, hence, allowing for social learning as described in Sec. 2.3 in the governance layer
as well. Additionally we allow for adaptive rewiring by setting the rewiring probability
to an intermediate value of φ = 0.4 (Fig. 3). Recall, that this implies that whenever
two nodes of different state or strategy in either layer interact there is a probability
of φ for the link between those two nodes to be homophilically rewired such that two
nodes of the same strategy or state are connected afterwards.
As a first general observation, we observe that increasing the tax rates γ increases
the size of the sustainable regime, i.e., the system converges to a state with all nodes
employing the sustainable strategy at smaller user waiting times Tu (Fig. 3). Hence,
increasing the tax rate also increases the resilience of the entire system.
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Fig. 3. If social learning happens in both, the user and the governance layer, rewiring at an
intermediate probability (here with φ = 0.4) induces a trade off. In particular, the system
is more likely to become sustainable at low tax rates but less likely to become sustainable
at high tax rates as compared to a setting where unsustainable nodes are always taxed
(compare Fig. 2)
.
We further find that social learning in the governance layer causes the absence of a
critical tax rate γcrit and, hence, there is no γ for which the system always converges
into the sustainable state (compare Fig. 2 and 3).
At the same time we find that social learning and network adaptation induce a
trade off (as compared to the case of a single sustainable governance node) where the
sustainable regime increases in size for the case of small tax rates γ but decreases in
size for larger tax rates γ (compare again the size of the sustainable regimes between
Fig. 2 and 3). This phenomenon is explained in the following.
Since the governance layer now partly consists of nodes that are in the indifferent
state, there is a chance for unsustainable nodes in the user layer to not being taxed.
In that case, their harvest likely exceeds that of sustainable nodes in the beginning
of the simulation if the average user waiting time ∆Tu is small. At the same time,
even if unsustainable nodes are being taxed at a moderate rate their harvest might
exceed that of sustainable nodes if their corresponding stocks are still far away from
equilibrium, i.e., depletion. Hence, the increased size of the unsustainable regime at
larger tax rates can be attributed to the effect of social learning in the governance
layer.
For low tax rates we observe a decrease in size of the unsustainable regime as
compared to the case of no social learning in the governance layer (Sec. 3.1) and,
more importantly, no network adaptation in either layer. It has been observed already
in earlier studies that adaptation fosters the tendency of the system to reach the
sustainable state as it allows nodes of the same strategy to form clusters [24]. This
clustering of specifically the sustainable nodes allows them to avoid exposure to the
unsustainable strategy (E+) until the sustainable strategy (E−) has become more
profitable. From there on the sustainable strategy can spread through the network
10 Will be inserted by the editor
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Fig. 4. The average fraction of sustainable agents for different combinations of tax rate γ,
user waiting time ∆Tu and adaptation probability φ.
and tip the entire system into a sustainable state even at lower user waiting times
as compared to the case with no adaptation (compare lower left parts of Fig. 2 and
3). Hence, the decrease in the size of the unsustainable regime for lower tax rates is
mainly attributed to the presence of adaptation in both, the user and the governance
layer.
In summary, we find that social learning in the governance layer increases the
size of the unsustainable regime at high tax rates when compared to the case of an
absence of social learning. At the same time, adaptive rewiring increases the size of
the sustainable regime at lower tax rates. In other words, at low tax rates network
adaptation and governmental social learning are preferred to drive the system into
a sustainable state, while at high tax rates social learning and adaptation are to be
avoided.
Will be inserted by the editor 11
3.4 Comprehensive analysis
We ultimately vary the three crucial parameters γ (tax rate), φ (adaptation/rewiring
probability) and ∆Tu (average user waiting time) to provide a comprehensive analysis
and to illustrate how the size of the sustainable regime depends on their particular
choices (Fig. 4). We summarize our three main results below:
i.) First, we present results for three choices of average user waiting time∆Tu = 0.5
(Fig. 4A), ∆Tu = 1.0 (Fig. 4B) and ∆Tu = 1.5 (Fig. 4C) and varying values of γ and
φ. For all three cases, we first observe that there exists a fragmentation threshold at
around φ ≈ 0.8 above which the final share of sustainable nodes in the user layer
roughly corresponds to the expected initial share of 0.5 (Fig. 4A-C). In addition we
find that for ∆Tu = 0.5 there exists an unsustainable regime for low tax rates γ and
low rewiring probabilities φ as the myopic agents do not foresee a potential collapse of
their respective resource stocks when being unsustainable or indifferent. However, the
size of this regime decreases in size with increasing γ (Fig. 4A) as the unsustainable
strategy becomes less profitable. With increasing the user waiting time to ∆Tu = 1.0
(Fig. 4B) or ∆Tu = 1.5 (Fig. 4C) the system converges into a sustainable state for
almost all choices of γ and φ as long as the rewiring rate is chosen such that the
fragmentation threshold is not transgressed. Hence, we conclude that the larger the
average user waiting time, the more likely the system converges into a sustainable
state (as it is also reported in earlier studies [24,40]).
ii.) Next, we present the results for three choices of tax rate γ = 0 (no taxation),
γ = 0.5 (intermediate taxation) and γ = 1 (full taxation) and varying user waiting
time∆Tu as well as rewiring probability φ (Fig. 4D-F). For the case of no taxation, i.e.,
no effect of the governance layer, (Fig. 4D) the size of the sustainable regime increases
linearly with increasing φ until, again, the fragmentation transition is reached. This
result is in accordance with earlier studies that investigate the effect of social learning
and adaptation in a system that is only comprised of the user and the resource
layer [24]. Increasing the tax rate steadily decreases the size of the unsustainable
regime (Fig. 4E+F), while the linear dependence between the rewiring probability φ
and the size of the regime sizes persists. Remarkably, even for the case of full taxation
(Fig. 4F) the unsustainable regime remains to exist as for very low user waiting times
∆Tu the unsustainable and indifferent strategies can spread through both layers as
the resource stocks deplete slower as compared to the rate of social interactions.
iii.) Ultimately, we consider three cases of rewiring probabilities, i.e., φ = 0 (no
rewiring and only social learning), φ = 0.4 (intermediate rewiring) and φ = 0.8 (al-
most only rewiring at a rate close to the fragmentation threshold and few cases of
social learning), Fig. 4G-I. Note that Fig. 4H shows the same results as the previously
discussed Fig. 3. As already discussed in Sec. 3.3 social learning in the governance
layer causes the absence of a critical tax rate γcrit, that we observed from the case
of a single sustainable governance node, Fig. 4G. However, allowing for rewiring at
an intermediate rate (Fig. 4H) again yields an increase in the size of the sustainable
regime. Further increasing the rewiring probability causes the size of the sustainable
regime to increase even further. However, as the system approaches the fragmentation
transition, the average fraction of sustainable users is lowered due to the formation
of isolated clusters of user and governance nodes that solely employ the unsustain-
able/indifferent strategy (Fig. 4I).
In summary, we observe that the system is most likely to reach a sustainable
regime if a high tax rate γ and a rewiring probability φ close to (but still below) the
fragmentation transition are chosen. In other words, such a combination of parame-
ters maximizes the size of the sustainable regime. Given that an implementation of
arbitrarily high tax rates is often not feasible, minimal/optimal tax rates could be
chosen for a given user waiting time ∆Tu and rewiring probability φ such that the
12 Will be inserted by the editor
system is likely to converge into a sustainable state while putting the least amount of
pressure as possible on to users that show an undesired strategy (see e.g., Fig. 4A).
4 Conclusion
In this article, we have developed a stylized model for polycentric hierarchical gover-
nance structures with a focus on investigating the preconditions for the sustainable
use of renewable resources. While resource users can employ either a sustainable or
non-sustainable harvesting strategy, policies are implemented via either taxation or
no taxation of non-sustainable resource use. The model design is targeted towards
a better systems understanding. Governance actors’ and resource users’ interactions
are driven by the following two social processes: social learning of favorable strategies
and homophilic network adaptation, but take place on different hierarchical scales.
Generally we find that sustainability is favored for slow interaction timescales,
large homophilic network adaptation (as long it is below the fragmentation threshold)
and high taxation rates. For the case of an eco-dictatorship, where a single governance
actor taxes all non-sustainable behavior, we find the intuitive result that a sufficiently
large taxation rate always causes a sustainable outcome. In contrast, in the fully
process-driven model with social learning and homophilic network adaptation among
governance actors, we find a trade-off: sustainability is enhanced for low and hindered
for high tax rates compared to the results obtained for the eco-dictatorship.
This rather non-intuitive result highlights that the emergent outcomes of freely
co-evolving social processes can be preferable compared to those obtained with a
benevolent centralistic actor, if low tax rates are a normative preference. In this
regard, our model serves as a stylized example to find minimal tax rates that still
guarantee an optimally sustainable outcome given polycentric governance structures,
given a social learning process with a certain network adaptation rate and interaction
timescale.
Possibly, our model could serve as a prototype for more detailed studies to be
targeted at the question of optimal carbon taxes rates [9]. It highlights how social
processes such as opinion formation may be combined with macro-economic optimiza-
tion techniques [19] in order to gain momentum on the road to the much needed rapid
decarbonization [17].
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